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Summary of Vulnerable Dependencies (click to show all)
Description:
This project provides base classes, types and methods
License:
Apache License Version 2.0: http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0.htmlFile Path: /home/runner/.m2/repository/org/bedework/bw-base/2.0.0/bw-base-2.0.0.jar
Description:
Basic support for json objects and types
License:
Apache License Version 2.0: http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0.htmlFile Path: /home/runner/.m2/repository/org/bedework/bw-json/2.0.0/bw-json-2.0.0.jar
Description:
This project provides logging utility classes and methods
License:
Apache License Version 2.0: http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0.htmlFile Path: /home/runner/.m2/repository/org/bedework/bw-util-logging/6.0.0/bw-util-logging-6.0.0.jar
Description:
This project provides a number of utility classes and methods
License:
Apache License Version 2.0: http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0.htmlFile Path: /home/runner/.m2/repository/org/bedework/bw-util-misc/6.0.1/bw-util-misc-6.0.1.jar
Description:
Apache Commons Lang, a package of Java utility classes for the classes that are in java.lang's hierarchy, or are considered to be so standard as to justify existence in java.lang. The code is tested using the latest revision of the JDK for supported LTS releases: 8, 11, 17 and 21 currently. See https://github.com/apache/commons-lang/blob/master/.github/workflows/maven.yml Please ensure your build environment is up-to-date and kindly report any build issues.
License:
https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0.txtFile Path: /home/runner/.m2/repository/org/apache/commons/commons-lang3/3.18.0/commons-lang3-3.18.0.jar
Description:
Apache Commons Text is a set of utility functions and reusable components for processing
and manipulating text in a Java environment.
License:
https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0.txtFile Path: /home/runner/.m2/repository/org/apache/commons/commons-text/1.14.0/commons-text-1.14.0.jar
Description:
Core annotations used for value types, used by Jackson data binding package.
License:
The Apache Software License, Version 2.0: https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0.txtFile Path: /home/runner/.m2/repository/com/fasterxml/jackson/core/jackson-annotations/2.18.2/jackson-annotations-2.18.2.jar
Description:
Core Jackson processing abstractions (aka Streaming API), implementation for JSON
License:
The Apache Software License, Version 2.0: https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0.txtFile Path: /home/runner/.m2/repository/com/fasterxml/jackson/core/jackson-core/2.18.2/jackson-core-2.18.2.jar
CVE-2026-68498 (OSSINDEX)
jackson-core - Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling Sonatype's research suggests that this CVE's details differ from those defined at NVD. See https://guide.sonatype.com/vulnerability/CVE-2026-68498 for detailsCWE-770 Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
Vulnerable Software & Versions (OSSINDEX):
CVE-2026-89407 (OSSINDEX)
NumberInput.looksLikeValidNumber() in FasterXML jackson-core pre-validates "stringified numbers" with two regular expressions: PATTERN_FLOAT ([+-]?[0-9]*[\.]?[0-9]+([eE][+-]?[0-9]+)?), present since 2.17.0, and PATTERN_FLOAT_TRAILING_DOT, added in 2.17.2. PATTERN_FLOAT places adjacent quantifiers over the same character class -- an optional [0-9]* run, an optional dot, then a required [0-9]+ run -- so input that ultimately fails to match forces Java's backtracking engine to retry every possible split point of the digit run. Matching cost therefore grows with the square of the input length. An attacker who can supply JSON that an application deserializes into a numeric target type reaches this method through jackson-databind's default String-to-number coercion (StdDeserializer and NumberDeserializers for BigDecimal, BigInteger, Double and Float). Because StreamReadConstraints.maxStringLength defaults to 20,000,000 characters, no constraint bounds the input before it reaches the regex. Testing by the reporter confirmed O(n^2) growth across five consecutive input-size doublings, with a single 160,000-character string consuming roughly 74 seconds in one call; a small number of concurrent requests of ordinary body size can therefore exhaust a server's request-handling thread pool. The affected method does not exist before 2.17.0, so 2.16.x and earlier releases are not affected. The fix replaces both regular expressions with a hand-rolled single-pass scan.CWE-1333 Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity
Vulnerable Software & Versions (OSSINDEX):
CVE-2026-89425 (OSSINDEX)
UTF8DataInputJsonParser._reportInvalidToken() in FasterXML jackson-core builds the offending-token text for its error message by appending Java identifier characters to a StringBuilder in a loop that has no upper bound. Unlike the three sibling parser implementations, including UTF8StreamJsonParser, it never consults ErrorReportConfiguration.getMaxErrorTokenLength() (default 256). A malformed token supplied to a parser created through JsonFactory.createParser(DataInput) is therefore accumulated in full. No StreamReadConstraints setting mitigates this: maxDocumentLength cannot be applied to DataInput sources at all, and maxStringLength does not cover this path because the accumulation bypasses ReadConstrainedTextBuffer. The reporter measured a 20,000,109-character exception message from a 20-million-character malformed token on the DataInput path, against 367 characters for identical input on the InputStream path. Scaling the payload drives the StringBuilder, which also incurs byte-to-char expansion and internal array doubling, to many times the raw payload size and can trigger OutOfMemoryError for the whole JVM. UTF8DataInputJsonParser was introduced in 2.8.0 together with createParser(DataInput); releases before 2.8.0 do not contain the affected class.CWE-400 Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
Vulnerable Software & Versions (OSSINDEX):
Description:
General data-binding functionality for Jackson: works on core streaming API
License:
The Apache Software License, Version 2.0: https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0.txtFile Path: /home/runner/.m2/repository/com/fasterxml/jackson/core/jackson-databind/2.18.2/jackson-databind-2.18.2.jar
CVE-2026-68497 (OSSINDEX)
jackson-databind binds a JSON string to a javax.xml.datatype.Duration or javax.xml.datatype.XMLGregorianCalendar field by passing the raw string verbatim to DatatypeFactory.newDuration(value) or newXMLGregorianCalendar(value) in CoreXMLDeserializers.Std._deserialize. These deserializers are registered by default with no opt-in, so a plain ObjectMapper or JsonMapper with no polymorphic typing and no special configuration reaches this path. The XML Schema lexical grammar permits numeric components of arbitrary length, which the JDK materializes through the native BigInteger(String) and BigDecimal(String) constructors, both quadratic in digit count. Because the digits sit inside a JSON string token rather than a JSON number token, jackson-core's StreamReadConstraints.maxNumberLength guard never applies; jackson's own NumberDeserializers call validateIntegerLength or validateFPLength before parsing a stringified number, but the XML datatype deserializer omits that pre-check. An unauthenticated attacker can therefore submit a single request of a few megabytes, such as a Duration value consisting of the letter P followed by several million digits and the letter Y, and force tens of seconds to several minutes of single-threaded CPU work; a handful of concurrent requests can saturate a server's worker threads. This affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind from 2.0.0 before 2.18.10, from 2.19.0 before 2.21.6, and from 2.22.0 before 2.22.2, and tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind from 3.0.0 before 3.1.6 and from 3.2.0 before 3.2.2. Users should upgrade to 2.18.10, 2.21.6, 2.22.2, 3.1.6, or 3.2.2.CWE-1333 Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity
Vulnerable Software & Versions (OSSINDEX):
CVE-2026-83557 (OSSINDEX)
jackson-databind - Deserialization of untrusted data [CVE-2026-83557]CWE-502 Deserialization of Untrusted Data
Vulnerable Software & Versions (OSSINDEX):
jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.10.0 until 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4, jackson-databind's PolymorphicTypeValidator (PTV) is the primary safety mechanism guarding polymorphic deserialization. When polymorphic typing is enabled and a type identifier contains generic parameters (i.e. the type ID string contains <), DatabindContext._resolveAndValidateGeneric() validates only the raw container class name (the substring before <) against the configured PTV. If the container type is approved, the method parses the full canonical type string via TypeFactory.constructFromCanonical() and returns the fully parameterized type without ever validating the nested type arguments against the PTV. The nested type arguments are then resolved, instantiated, and populated as beans during deserialization. An attacker who controls the type ID can therefore place a denied class as a generic type parameter of an allowed container — for example java.util.ArrayList<com.evil.Gadget> when only java.util.ArrayList is allow-listed. The container passes the PTV check; com.evil.Gadget is loaded via Class.forName(name, true, loader), instantiated, and its properties are set from attacker-controlled JSON. This completely bypasses an explicitly configured PTV allow-list. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4.CWE-502 Deserialization of Untrusted Data, CWE-184 Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs
Vulnerable Software & Versions: (show all)
jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.10.0 until 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4, BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator.Builder.allowIfSubTypeIsArray() allowlists any array type based only on clazz.isArray(), without validating the array's component (element) type against the configured allowlist. A PTV built with allowIfSubTypeIsArray() plus an explicit concrete-type allowlist therefore still permits EvilType[] even though EvilType is not allowlisted. When Jackson deserializes the elements and no per-element type IDs are present, it instantiates the component type directly with no further PTV check, bypassing the allowlist. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4.CWE-184 Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs
Vulnerable Software & Versions: (show all)
CVE-2026-19032 (OSSINDEX)
jackson-databind's deserializer for java.nio.file.Path resolves an attacker-supplied URI without restricting the URI scheme. In JDKFromStringDeserializer.NioPathHelper.deserialize, a string bound from untrusted JSON is passed to new URI(value) and then to Path.of(uri). When that throws FileSystemNotFoundException, the code enumerates ServiceLoader<FileSystemProvider> and calls provider.getPath(uri) on the first provider whose scheme matches the attacker-chosen scheme. Untrusted JSON can therefore select and drive an arbitrary registered FileSystemProvider during readValue under a default JsonMapper, and forces provider class loading at the same time. With only the JDK built-in providers (file, jar/zipfs) present, the resolved path is inert and no mount or network I/O occurs; further impact requires a side-effecting third-party FileSystemProvider on the classpath. This affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind from 2.8.0 before 2.18.10, from 2.19.0 before 2.21.6, and from 2.22.0 before 2.22.2, and tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind from 3.0.0 before 3.1.6 and from 3.2.0 before 3.2.2. Users should upgrade to 2.18.10, 2.21.6, 2.22.2, 3.1.6, or 3.2.2. Binding java.nio.file.Path from untrusted JSON should be avoided regardless of version.CWE-470 Use of Externally-Controlled Input to Select Classes or Code ('Unsafe Reflection')
Vulnerable Software & Versions (OSSINDEX):
CVE-2026-54518 (OSSINDEX)
jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.21.0 until 2.21.4 and 3.1.4, UnwrappedPropertyHandler.processUnwrappedCreatorProperties() replays buffered JSON into creator parameters but never consults prop.visibleInView(activeView). The normal property-based creator path gates creator properties on the active view, but this unwrapped-creator replay path bypasses that check, so a constructor parameter annotated with both @JsonView(AdminView.class) and @JsonUnwrapped is populated from attacker JSON even when a more restrictive view is active. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.21.4 and 3.1.4. Sonatype's research suggests that this CVE's details differ from those defined at NVD. See https://guide.sonatype.com/vulnerability/CVE-2026-54518 for detailsCWE-863 Incorrect Authorization
Vulnerable Software & Versions (OSSINDEX):
CVE-2026-77310 (OSSINDEX)
jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. Prior to versions 2.18.9, 2.21.5, 2.22.1, 3.1.5, and 3.2.1 on their respective release lines, the java.net.InetAddress branch of FromStringDeserializer.Std._deserialize() calls InetAddress.getByName() on attacker-controlled input, causing eager DNS resolution during deserialization and enabling DNS-based server-side request forgery and internal-host enumeration. This issue is fixed in versions 2.18.9, 2.21.5, 2.22.1, 3.1.5, and 3.2.1.CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
Vulnerable Software & Versions (OSSINDEX):
CVE-2026-91776 (OSSINDEX)
TypeDeserializerBase._findDeserializer() in FasterXML jackson-databind caches the resolved deserializer under the raw, attacker-supplied type ID. When name-based polymorphism is configured with a fallback, for example @JsonTypeInfo(use = Id.NAME, defaultImpl = ...), every distinct unrecognized type ID resolves to the same fallback deserializer but is retained as its own key in the _deserializers map. That map has no configurable bound and lives for the lifetime of the type deserializer, so an attacker who can repeatedly supply fresh unknown type IDs causes monotonic memory retention across requests. The reporter observed 10,000 retained entries from 10,000 distinct unknown IDs, against a single entry for a control that repeated one unknown ID the same number of times, isolating attacker-controlled key cardinality from request volume. Exploitation requires an application that enables name-based polymorphism with a defaultImpl or equivalent fallback, accepts attacker-influenced type IDs, and reuses a long-lived ObjectMapper across requests. The fix stops caching fallback resolutions for unrecognized IDs and bounds both the number of cached entries and the length of a cacheable type ID.CWE-400 Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
Vulnerable Software & Versions (OSSINDEX):
CVE-2026-91777 (OSSINDEX)
Forward-reference completion for @JsonIdentityInfo object IDs in FasterXML jackson-databind performs a linear scan of the pending-reference accumulator for every resolved ID. The affected paths are CollectionDeserializer.CollectionReferringAccumulator.resolveForwardReference() and the equivalent implementation in MapDeserializer. When a document first creates N unresolved object-ID references in an identity-enabled collection or map and then defines those same IDs in reverse order, completion performs on the order of N * (N + 1) / 2 identity comparisons, so a shallow document whose size grows linearly causes quadratic CPU work during deserialization. The reporter instrumented equals() calls on the ID class and measured exactly 2,003,000 comparisons at N = 2,000, against zero comparisons in the pending-reference lookup path for an equally sized control in which every reference was already resolved. The input requires no deep nesting and no syntactically unusual JSON. Exploitation requires an application that deserializes attacker-influenced JSON into an identity-enabled collection or map. The fix replaces the repeated linear lookup with a keyed pending-reference structure.CWE-400 Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
Vulnerable Software & Versions (OSSINDEX):
CVE-2026-59888 (OSSINDEX)
jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.15.0 until 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4, Java Records using a PropertyNamingStrategy can bypass @JsonIgnore because POJOPropertiesCollector._removeUnwantedIgnorals() records an ignored component under its original implicit name before _renameUsing() applies the naming strategy, allowing the renamed JSON key to be assigned to the Record constructor parameter. This issue is fixed in versions 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4.CWE-915 Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes
Vulnerable Software & Versions (OSSINDEX):
CVE-2026-59889 (OSSINDEX)
jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.18.0 until 2.18.9, 2.21.5, 2.22.1, 3.1.5, and 3.2.1, UnwrappedPropertyHandler.processUnwrapped() replays buffered JSON for a @JsonUnwrapped property and calls prop.deserializeAndSet() without a prop.visibleInView(ctxt.getActiveView()) guard, allowing a property annotated with both @JsonView and @JsonUnwrapped to be written from attacker JSON under a less-privileged active view. This issue is fixed in versions 2.18.9, 2.21.5, 2.22.1, 3.1.5, and 3.2.1. Sonatype's research suggests that this CVE's details differ from those defined at NVD. See https://guide.sonatype.com/vulnerability/CVE-2026-59889 for detailsCWE-863 Incorrect Authorization
Vulnerable Software & Versions (OSSINDEX):
jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.0.0 until 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4, JDKFromStringDeserializer constructed InetSocketAddress with new InetSocketAddress(host, port), which performs eager DNS name resolution for hostname inputs at deserialization time. An application that binds untrusted JSON into a type containing an InetSocketAddress field issues an attacker-chosen DNS query during readValue, before any application-level validation or connect logic. The fix uses InetSocketAddress.createUnresolved(host, port), deferring DNS to an explicit connect. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4.CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
Vulnerable Software & Versions: (show all)
jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.8.0 until 2.18.9, 2.21.5, and 3.1.4, in BeanDeserializerBase.createContextual(), per-property @JsonIgnoreProperties exclusions are applied by _handleByNameInclusion(), producing a contextual deserializer whose BeanPropertyMap has the ignored properties removed. The subsequent per-property case-insensitivity block (triggered by @JsonFormat(ACCEPT_CASE_INSENSITIVE_PROPERTIES)) rebuilds from this._beanProperties (the original, unfiltered map) instead of contextual._beanProperties, then overwrites the filtered map — restoring every property _handleByNameInclusion had just removed. The ignored property becomes writable again. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.18.9, 2.21.5, and 3.1.4.CWE-915 Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes
Vulnerable Software & Versions: (show all)